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Abstract. Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group
communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other secrets,
see, e.g., [11]. In [1], building upon [3], we studied distributed epistemic gossip
protocols, which are examples of knowledge based programs introduced in [6].
These protocols use as guards formulas from a simple epistemic logic. We show
here that these protocols are implementable by proving that it is decidable to
determine whether a formula with no nested modalities is true after a sequence
of calls. Building upon this result we further show that the problems of partial
correctness and of termination of such protocols are decidable, as well.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Knowledge-based programs were introduced in [6] —these are programs that use tests
for knowledge. Examples are protocols for the sequence transmission problem, such as
the alternating bit protocol, studied in [7]. A more recent example are the distributed
epistemic gossip protocols introduced in [3] and further studied in a slightly different
setting in [1].
In gossip protocols each agent holds a secret initially known only to him. The se-
crets spread by means of communications. During them, e.g., point-to-point or group
communications, the participating agents exchange all secrets they know. The aim of
the gossip protocols is to arrive at a situation in which all the agents know each other
secrets, see, e.g., the early survey [8], the book coverage [10] or a more recent paper
[11].
As shown in [1], the formulation of distributed gossip protocols as knowledge-based
programs considerably simplifies the task of their verification. The reason is that these
protocols are strikingly simple in their syntax based on epistemic logic (though not
semantics) —they are just parallel compositions of loops in which the agents repeatedly
perform a call assuming the corresponding epistemic guard evaluates to true. One issue
ignored in [1] was the natural question: are these gossip protocols implementable?
In this paper we provide a positive answer to this question. More precisely, we show
that it is decidable to determine whether a formula with no nested modalities is true after
a sequence of calls. All gossip protocols studied in [3] use only such formulas as guards.
We also study correctness and termination of these protocols. Building upon the just
mentioned result we show that it is decidable to determine whether a given distributed
epistemic gossip protocol is correct. Namely, the formula that expresses its correctness
is with no nested modalities and we show that for such formulas truth is decidable. The
final result allows us to solve the halting problem for these protocols. This shows that
the distributed epistemic gossip protocols are very specific programs that in particular
do not have the full power of the Turing machines.
The obtained results, while sufficient for a study of the considered protocols, do
not address more general questions concerning both the logic itself and the protocols,
which remain open and to which we return in the conclusions.
Finally, let us mention here some recent works on gossip protocols. In [2] a tool is
presented that given a high level description of an epistemic protocol in the setting of
[3] generates the characteristics of the protocol. The calls considered there differ from
ours, so this approach is not applicable to our setting. Further, [13] presents a study
of dynamic distributed gossip protocols in which the calls allow the agents not only
to share the secrets but also to transmit the links. The purpose of the paper is to char-
acterize such protocols in terms of the class of graphs for which they terminate. Such
protocols then differ from the ones here considered, which are static. Next, in [9] gossip
protocols are studied that aim at achieving higher-order shared knowledge. Finally, in
[4] gossip protocols are studied as an instance of multi-agent epistemic planning that is
subsequently translated into the classical planning language PDDL.
1.2 Plan
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we recall the syntax and
semantics introduced in [1]. Then, in Section 4 we introduce an alternative, equivalent,
semantics, which helps us to prove the desired decidability results. In Section 5 we
prove the decidability of checking whether a formula with no nested modalities is true
after a given sequence of calls, and in Section 6 we show how to extend this result to
checking whether such a formula is true (so true after any sequence of calls). In turn, in
Section 7 we show that it is also decidable to determine whether a given gossip protocol
terminates. Then, in the final section, we list some related open problems and clarify
the difference between the type of calls studied in [1] and [3].
2 Syntax
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set A of at least three agents. We assume
that each agent holds exactly one secret and that there exists a bijection between the
set of agents and the set of secrets. We denote by P the set of all secrets. Our aim
is to analyze what the agents know after a sequence of calls took place. So first we
introduce the calls and then consider an epistemic language allowing us to refer to
agents’ knowledge.
Assume a fixed ordering on the agents. Each call concerns two different agents, say
a and b, and is written as ab, where agent a precedes agent b in the assumed ordering.
Calls are denoted by c, d. Abusing notation we write a ∈ c to denote that agent a is
one of the two agents involved in the call c (e.g., for c := ab we have a ∈ c and b ∈ c).
We consider formulas in a simple epistemic language defined by the following
grammar:
φ ::= Fap | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kaφ,
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. Each secret is viewed a distinct constant. We denote the secret
of agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B and so on. We denote the set of so defined
formulas by L and we refer to its members as epistemic formulas.
We read Fap as ‘agent a is familiar with the secret p’ and Kaφ as ‘agent a knows
that formula φ is true’. So Fap is an atomic formula, whileKaφ is a compound formula.
In fact, all atomic formulas of L are of the form Fap.
In [1], as a follow up on [3], we also introduced distributed epistemic gossip pro-
tocols. We do not discuss them here and only mention that formulas of L are used in
them as guards. All guards used in [1] are built from the formulas FaB and KaFbC,
where a and b are different agents, by means of the Boolean connectives. Thus no nested
modalities are used in the guards.
3 Semantics
We now recall from [1] semantics of the epistemic formulas. To this end we recall first
the concept of a gossip situation.
3.1 Gossip situations and their modifications
A gossip situation (in short a situation) is a sequence s = (Qa)a∈A, where Qa ⊆ P for
each agent a. Intuitively, Qa is the set of secrets a is familiar with in situation s. The
initial gossip situation is the one in which each Qa equals {A} and is denoted by root.
We say that an agent a is an expert in a situation s if he is familiar in s with all the
secrets, i.e., if Qa = P. The initial gossip situation reflects the fact that initially each
agent is familiar only with his own secret.
In this paper we do not study particular gossip protocols. We mention only that their
goal is to reach a gossip situation in which each agent is an expert.
We will use the following concise notation for gossip situations. Sets of secrets
will be written down as lists. e.g., the set {A,B,C} will be written as ABC. Gossip
situations will be written down as lists of lists of secrets separated by dots. E.g., if there
are three agents, then root = A.B.C and the gossip situation ({A,B}, {A,B}, {C})
will be written as AB.AB.C.
Each call transforms the current gossip situation by modifying the set of secrets the
agents involved in the call are familiar with. Consider a gossip situation s := (Qd)d∈A.
Then ab(s) := (Q′d)d∈A, where Q
′
a = Q
′
b = Qa ∪ Qb, Q′c = Qc, for c 6= a, b. This
simply says that the only effect of a call is that the secrets are shared between the two
agents involved in it.
3.2 Call sequences
In [1] computations of the gossip protocols were studied, so both finite and infinite call
sequences were used. Here we limit ourselves to the finite call sequences as we are only
interested in the semantics of epistemic formulas.
So in this paper, in contrast to [1], a call sequence is a finite sequence of calls. The
empty sequence is denoted by . We use c to denote a call sequence and C to denote the
set of all call sequences. Given call sequences c and d and a call c we denote by c.c the
outcome of adding c at the end of the sequence c and by c.d the outcome of appending
the sequences c and d. We write c  d to denote the fact that d extends c, i.e., that for
some c′ we have c.c′ = d.
The result of applying a call sequence to a situation s is defined inductively as
follows:
[Base] (s) := s,
[Step] (c.c)(s) := c(c(s)).
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c}. Consider the call sequence (ac, bc, ac). It generates the
following successive gossip situations starting from root:
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC bc−→ AC.ABC.ABC ac−→ ABC.ABC.ABC.
Hence (ac, bc, ac)(root) = (ABC.ABC.ABC). 2
3.3 Gossip models and truth
A gossip situation is a set of possible combinations of secret distributions among the
agents. As calls progress in sequence from the initial situation, agents may be uncer-
tain about which one of such secrets distributions is the actual one. This uncertainty is
captured by appropriate equivalence relations on the call sequences.
Definition 1. A gossip model is a tupleM := (C, {∼a}a∈A), where each ∼a⊆ C×C
is defined inductively as follows.
[Base]  ∼a ;
[Step] Suppose c ∼a d.
(i) If a 6∈ c, then c.c ∼a d and c ∼a d.c.
(ii) If a ∈ c and c.c(root)a = d.c(root)a, then c.c ∼a d.c.
A gossip model with a designated call sequence is called a pointed gossip model.
For instance, by (i) we have ab, bc ∼a ab, bd. But we do not have bc, ab ∼a bd, ab
since (bc, ab)(root)a = ABC 6= ABD = (bd, ab)(root)a.
We recall now from [1] the following two properties of ∼a.
Fact 1
(i) Each ∼a is an equivalence relation;
(ii) For all c,d ∈ C if c ∼a d, then c(root)a = d(root)a.
Finally, we recall the definition of truth.
Definition 2. Let (M, c) be a pointed gossip model with M := (C, (∼a)a∈A) and
c ∈ C. We define the satisfaction relation |= inductively as follows (clauses for Boolean
connectives are as usual and omitted):
(M, c) |= Fap iff p ∈ c(root)a,
(M, c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d s.t. c ∼a d, (M,d) |= φ.
Further
M |= φ iff ∀c (M, c) |= φ.
WhenM |= φ we say that φ is true. 2
So formula Fap is true whenever secret p belongs to the set of secrets agent a is familiar
with in the situation generated by the designated call sequence c applied to the initial
situation root. The knowledge operator is interpreted as customary in epistemic logic
using the equivalence relations ∼a.
4 An alternative equivalence relation
In this section we provide an alternative equivalence relation between the call sequences
that is easier to work with. To this end we introduce a view of agent a of a call sequence
c, written as ca, and defined by induction as follows.
[Base]
a := root,
[Step]
(c.c)a :=
{
ca
c−→ s if a ∈ c
ca otherwise
where for d ∈ A
sd :=
{
c.c(root)d if d ∈ c
s′d otherwise
where s′ is the last gossip situation in ca.
Intuitively, a view of agent a of a call sequence c is the information he acquires by
means of the calls in c he is involved in. It consists of a sequence of gossip situations
connected by the calls in which a is involved in. After each such call, say ab, agent a
updates the set of gossips he and b are currently familiar with.
Example 2. Let us return to Example 1. So A = {a, b, c} and we consider the call
sequence (ac, bc, ac). We noticed there that it generates the following successive gossip
situations starting from root:
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC bc−→ AC.ABC.ABC ac−→ ABC.ABC.ABC.
We now compare it with the view of agent a of the sequence (ac, bc, ac), which is
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
Thus, in the final gossip situation of this view, agent b is familiar with neither the
secret A nor C. However, the final gossip situation of a view does not reflect agents’
knowledge. In fact, as we shall see, according to the semantics, after the above sequence
of calls, agent a knows that agent b is familiar both with A and C. 2
We now introduce for each agent a an equivalence relation ≡a between the call
sequences, defined as follows:
c ≡a d iff ca = da.
So according to this definition two call sequences are equivalent for agent a if his
views of them are the same. The following result shows that the equivalence relations
∼a and ≡a coincide.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence). For each agent a the relations ∼a and ≡a coincide.
Proof. Omitted. uunionsq
So two call sequences are ∼a equivalent iff their views by agent a coincide. This alter-
native definition of the equivalence relation between the call sequences makes it simpler
to determine various properties of our semantics.
Below, given a call c, we denote by c∗ a sequence consisting of zero or more calls c
and by c+ a sequence consisting of one or more calls c.
Example 3. Note that we have (M, (ac, bc, ac)) |= KaFbA. To see this recall from
Example 2 that the view of agent a of the sequence (ac, bc, ac) is
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
So if (ac, bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form ac, (bc)+, ac, (bc)∗, which implies that
(M,d) |= FbA.
We conclude that it is possible that an agent, here a, knows that another agent,
here b, is familiar with his (so a’s) secret even though no communication took place
between them. The same argument shows that (M, (ac, bc, ac)) |= KaFbC, as claimed
in Example 2. 2
In the examples and proofs below we use the ≡a relation instead of ∼a and repeat-
edly appeal to the Equivalence Theorem 2. First we show that an immediate repetition
of a call has no effect on the truth of the formulas. More precisely, the following holds.
Theorem 3 (Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1, c, c2 and d := c1, c, c, c2. Then for all
formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction of the structure of φ. For the formulas of the form Fap
it suffices to note that c(root) = d(root). The only induction step of interest is for the
formulas of the form Kaφ. Suppose first that a 6∈ c. Then c ≡a d, so (M, c) |= Kaφ
iff (M,d) |= Kaφ.
Assume now that a ∈ c. Suppose that (M, c) |= Kaφ. Take d′ such that d ≡a d′.
Then d′ is of the form d′1, c, c,d
′
2. Let c
′ := d′1, c,d
′
2. By the induction hypothesis
(M,d′) |= φ iff (M, c′) |= φ. Further, d ≡a d′ implies that c ≡a c′. So (M, c′) |= φ.
Hence (M,d′) |= φ and consequently (M,d) |= Kaφ.
The proof in the other direction is analogous. uunionsq
The above result cannot be extended to a repetition of the call sequences. Indeed,
we have (M, (ab, bc)) |= ¬FaC, and (M, (ab, bc, ab, bc)) |= FaC. On the other hand
a monotonicity result holds for positive formulas.
Theorem 4 (Monotonicity). Suppose that φ is a formula that does not contain the ¬
symbol. Then
c  d and (M, c) |= φ implies (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The only case of interest is when
φ is of the form Kaψ. Suppose that c  d and (M, c) |= φ. Take some call sequence
d′ such that d ≡a d′. Then for some call sequences d1 and d′1 such that d1,d′1 = d′ we
have c ≡a d1.
We have by the assumption (M,d1) |= ψ, so by the induction hypothesis (M,d′) |=
ψ. As d′ was arbitrarily chosen we conclude that (M,d) |= φ. uunionsq
Here and below we say that a call is a b-call if agent b is involved in it. Before we
deal with the decidability matters consider the formula KaFbC for pairwise different
agents a, b, c. The following example reveals that it can be true in some subtle ways.
Example 4.
(i) First, note that a can learn (that is, know) that agent b is familiar with the secret C
through a direct communication with b.
Indeed, we have (M, (bc, ab)) |= KaFbC. Namely the view of agent a of the se-
quence (bc, ab) is
A.B.C
ab−→ ABC.ABC.C.
So if (bc, ab) ≡a d, then d is of the form (bc)+, ab, (bc)∗, which implies that (M,d) |=
FbC.
(ii) Further, it is also possible that a learns that b is familiar with the secret C through
a direct communication with c.
Indeed, we have (M, (bc, ac)) |= KaFbC. To see this note that the view of agent a
of the sequence (bc, ac) is
A.B.C
ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
So if (bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form (bc)+, ac, (bc)∗, which implies that (M,d) |=
FbC.
(iii) Also, it is possible that a learns that b is familiar with the secret C without ever
communicating with b or c.
Namely, we have (M, (cd, ad, bd, ad)) |= KaFbC. Indeed, the view of agent a of
the sequence (cd, ad, bd, ad) is
A.B.C.D
ad−→ ACD.B.C.ACD ad−→ ABCD.B.C.ABCD.
So if (cd, ad, bd, ad) ≡a d, then d is of the form (cd)+, (bc)∗, ad,d′, ad,d′′, where in
d′ a call bd took place or a call bc followed by a call cd took place, and in d′ and d′′ no
a-call took place. This implies that (M,d) |= FbC.
(iv) In (iii) agent a learned that b is familiar with c by communicating with agent d
twice. But it is also possible that a learns that b is familiar with the secret C without
communicating with any agent twice.
To see this note that (M, (cd, ad, bc, ac)) |= KaFbC. Indeed, the view of agent a
of the sequence (cd, ad, bc, ac) is
A.B.C.D
ad−→ ACD.B.C.ACD ac−→ ABCD.B.ABCD.ACD.
So if (cd, ad, bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form (cd)+, ad,d′, ac,d′′, where in d′ a call
bc took place or a call bd followed by a call cd took place, and in d′ and d′′ no a-call
took place. This implies that (M,d) |= FbC. 2
We conclude by noting that the Monotonicity Theorem 4 does not hold when we ex-
tend the call sequences to the left. Indeed, as observed in Example 4(ii), (M, (bc, ac)) |=
KaFbC. However, (M, (cd, bc, ac)) |= ¬KaFbC, since (cd, bc, ac) ≡a (bd, cd, ac)
and (M, (bd, cd, ac)) |= ¬FbC.
5 Decidability of semantics
In this section we show that the definition of semantics given in Definition 2 is decidable
for formulas that do not use nested modalities.
Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c1.c of c, c1(root) = c1.c(root), then
we say that c is redundant in c. First note the following observation.
Lemma 1 (Semantic Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1, c, c2 and d := c1, c2, where
c is redundant in c. Then for all propositional formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The only case of interest is when
φ is of the form Fap. The redundancy of c implies that c(root) = d(root). Hence
(M, c) |= Fap iff p ∈ c(root)a iff p ∈ d(root)a iff (M,d) |= Fap. uunionsq
The following example shows that Lemma 1 does not extend to arbitrary formulas
of L.
Example 5. In the call sequence ab, ac, bc, ab the second call ab is redundant since
(ab, ac, bc, ab)(root) = (ab, ac, bc)(root) = ABC.ABC.ABC.
However, (M, (ab, ac, bc, ab)) |= KaFbC, because if d ≡a (ab, ac, bc, ab) then d
is of the form (ab, ac, bc+, ab, bc∗). At the same time, (M, (ab, ac, bc)) |= ¬KaFbC
since (ab, ac, bc) ≡a (ab, ac). 2
Now, consider an agent a and a call sequence c. Starting from c we repeatedly
remove from the current call sequence a redundant call that does not involve agent a.
We call each outcome of such an iteration an a-reduction of c.
Corollary 1. Let d be an a-reduction of c. Then
(i) c ≡a d,
(ii) for all propositional formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof.
(i) It suffices to note that a removal of a redundant call that does not involve agent a
does not affect his view of the call sequence.
(ii) By the repeated use of the Semantic Stuttering Lemma 1. uunionsq
Given an agent a we now say that a call sequence c is a-redundant free if no call c
from c such that a 6∈ c is redundant in it. Clearly each a-reduction is a-redundant free.
We now prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 2. For each agent a and a call sequence c the set of a-redundant free call
sequences d such that c ≡a d is finite.
Proof. Consider an a-redundant free call sequence d such that c ≡a d. Then d has the
same number, say k, of a-calls as c.
Associate with d the sequence of gossip situations d0(root),d1(root), ...,dm(root),
where m is the length of d, d0 = , and dk = d1, d2, . . . , dk for k = 1, . . . ,m. This
sequence monotonically grows, where we interpret the inclusion relation component-
wise. Moreover, for all calls di such that a 6∈ di the corresponding inclusion is strict.
Consequently, m, the length of d, is bounded by k + |A|2, the sum of the number of
a-calls in c and of the total number of secrets in the gossip situation in which each agent
is an expert.
But for eachm there are only finitely many call sequences of length at mostm. This
concludes the proof. uunionsq
We can now state and prove the desired result.
Theorem 5 (Decidability of Semantics). For each call sequence c it is decidable
whether for a formula φ with no nested modalities (M, c) |= φ holds.
Proof. We use the definition of semantics as the algorithm. We only need to show that
the case of the formulas of the form Kaφ, where φ is a propositional formula, can be
rewritten by referring to a finite set of call sequences d that can be explicitly constructed.
Thanks to the Equivalence Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 we can rewrite the clause for
Kaφ as:
(M, c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d s.t. c ∼a d and d is a-redundant free, (M,d) |= φ,
and according to Lemma 2 this definition indeed refers to an explicitly constructed finite
set of call sequences d. uunionsq
6 Decidability of truth
Next, we show that truth for formulas that do not use nested modalities is decidable.
This implies that the verification problem of gossip protocols, i.e., the problem of de-
termining whether upon protocol’s termination every agent is an expert, is decidable for
protocols that do not use nested modalities. These include all protocols discussed in [1].
The key notion in our approach is that of an epistemic view. It is a function of a call
sequence c, denoted by EV (c), defined by
– putting for each agent a ∈ A, EV (c)(a) = {d(root) | c ∼a d}, and setting
– EV (c)(∗) = c(root).
So EV (c)(a) is the set of all gossip situations consistent with agent a’s observations
made throughout c and EV (c)(∗) is the actual gossip situation after c takes place. Note
that if c ∼a d then EV (c)(a) = EV (d)(a).
Lemma 3. For each call sequence c and agent a the set EV (c)(a) is finite and can be
effectively constructed.
Proof. Fix an agent a. By Corollary 1, Equivalence Theorem 2, and Fact 1(ii) to con-
struct the set EV (c)(a) it suffices to consider a-redundant free call sequences d and by
Lemma 2 there are only finitely many such call sequences d for which d ∼a c. uunionsq
Our interest in epistemic views stems from the following result.
Lemma 4. Suppose that EV (c) = EV (d). Then for all epistemic formulas with no
nested modalities φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. A simple proof by induction shows that for a propositional formula ψ and ar-
bitrary call sequences c′ and d′, c′(root) = d′(root) implies that (M, c′) |= ψ iff
(M,d′) |= ψ. Since EV (c)(∗) = c(root) and EV (d)(∗) = d(root), this settles the
case for φ = Fap.
The above observation also implies that for a propositional formula ψ and an agent
a,
(M, c) |= Kaψ iff ∀c′ s.t. c′(root) ∈ EV (c)(a), (M, c′) |= ψ.
Since EV (c)(a) = EV (d)(a), this settles the case for φ = Kaψ.
The remaining cases of negation and conjunction follow directly by the induction.
uunionsq
The above lemma is useful because the set of epistemic views is finite, in contrast
to the set of call sequences. Next, we provide an inductive definition of EV (c.c)(a) the
importance of which will become clear in a moment.
Lemma 5. For any call sequence c, call c, and agent a such that a ∈ c
EV (c.c)(a) = {c(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a}.
Proof. Intuitively the condition c(s)a = c(c(root))a states that s is consistent with the
observation agent a gets after call c is made in the gossip situation c(root).
(⊆ ) Take s′ ∈ EV (c.c)(a). By the definition of EV (c.c)(a) there exists a call sequence
d.c such that d.c ∼a c.c and s′ = d.c(root). So s′ = c(s), where s = d(root). We also
have d ∼a c, so d(root) ∈ EV (c)(a). Moreover, c(d(root))a = c(c(root))a, because
d.c ∼a c.c.
(⊇) Take s′ ∈ {c(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a}. So for some gossip
situation s we have s′ = c(s), s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a. The second fact
implies that there exists a call sequence d such that d ∼a c and s = d(root). Now, this
and the third fact imply that d.c ∼a c.c. So d.c(root) ∈ EV (c.c)(a). Consequently also
s′ ∈ EV (c.c)(a), since s′ = c(s) = d.c(root). uunionsq
This brings us to the following important conclusion stating that EV (c.c) can be
computed using EV (c) and c only, i.e., without referring to c. Denote the set of epis-
temic views by E˜V and recall that C denotes the set of calls.
Corollary 2. There exists a function f : E˜V ×C→ E˜V such that for any call sequence
c and call c
EV (c.c)(a) = f(EV (c), c).
Proof. By the definition of∼a we have EV (c.c)(a) = EV (c)(a) if a 6∈ c, EV (c.c)(∗) =
c(EV (c)(∗)). This in conjunction with the above lemma implies the claim. uunionsq
Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c1.c2 of c, we have EV (c1) =
EV (c1.c2), then we say that the call subsequence c2 is epistemically redundant in
c and that c is epistemically redundant.
We say that c is epistemically non-redundant if it is not epistemically redundant.
Equivalently, a call sequence c1.c2. . . . .ck is epistemically non-redundant if the set
{EV (c1.c2. . . . .ci) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}
has k elements.
We now show a counterpart of the Semantic Stuttering Lemma 1 for epistemic
views.
Lemma 6 (Epistemic Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1.c2.c3 and d := c1.c3, where
c2 is epistemically redundant in c. Then EV (c) = EV (d).
Proof. Let c3 = c1.c2. . . . .ck. First note that thanks to Corollary 2 we have EV (c1.c2.c1)
= EV (c1.c1), since EV (c1.c2.c1) = f(EV (c1.c2), c1) = f(EV (c1), c1) = EV (c1.c1)
due to the epistemic redundancy of c2 in c. Repeating this argument for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
we get that EV (c1.c2.c1.c2. . . . .ci) = EV (c1.c1.c2. . . . .ci).
In particular EV (c) = EV (d). uunionsq
Corollary 3. For every call sequence c there exists an epistemically non-redundant call
sequence d such that for all epistemic formulas with no nested modalities φ, (M, c) |=
φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. By the repeated use of the Epistemic Stuttering Lemma 6 and Lemma 4. uunionsq
Next, we prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 7. For any given model M, there are only finitely many epistemically non-
redundant call sequences.
Proof. Note that each epistemic view is a function from A ∪ {∗} to the set of functions
from A to 2|P| (this is an overestimation because for ∗ this set has only one element).
There are k = 2(|A|+1)·2
|A|·|P|
such functions, so any call sequence longer than k has
an epistemically redundant call subsequence. But there are only finitely many call se-
quences of length at most k. This concludes the proof. uunionsq
Finally, we can establish the announced result.
Theorem 6 (Decidability of Truth). For any formula φ with no nested modalities, it
is decidable whetherM |= φ holds.
Proof. Recall thatM |= φ iff ∀c (M, c) |= φ. Thanks to Corollary 3 we can rewrite
the latter as
∀c s.t. c is epistemically non-redundant, (M, c) |= φ.
But according to Lemma 7 there are only finitely many epistemically non-redundant
call sequences and by Lemma 3 their set can be explicitly constructed. uunionsq
As an easy consequence we obtain the following.
Corollary 4. It is decidable to determine whether a given gossip situation can be an
outcome of a call sequence.
Proof. Each gossip situation s = (Qd)d∈A can be encoded as a conjunction
φ(s) =
∧
a∈A
( ∧
B∈Qa
FaB ∧
∧
B 6∈Qa
¬FaB
)
.
Then ∃c(c(root) = s) iff ∃c((M, c) |= φ(s)) iff ¬(M |= ¬φ(s)).
uunionsq
7 Decidability of termination
Finally, we show that it is decidable to determine whether a gossip protocol terminates.
First, we establish monotonicity of gossip situations and epistemic views with respect to
call sequence extensions. Intuitively, we claim that as the call sequence gets longer each
agent acquires more information. This can be seen as a counterpart of the Monotonicity
Theorem 4. First we need to define suitable partial orderings ≤s and ≤ev over gossip
situations and epistemic views, respectively.
Definition 3. For any two gossip situations s, s′ we write s ≤s s′ if for all a ∈ A we
have sa ⊆ s′a.
Note 1. For all call sequences c and d such that c  d we have c(root) ≤s d(root).
Proof. For any gossip situation s and call cwe have by definition s ≤s c(s). By induction
this implies that for any call sequence c′ we have s ≤s c′(s). Now c  d implies that
d = c.c′ for some c′. Therefore, c(root) ≤s c′(c(root)) = d(root). uunionsq
Definition 4. For any two epistemic views V, V ′ ∈ E˜V we write V ≤ev V ′ if for all
a ∈ A there exists X ⊆ V (a) and an surjective (onto) function g : X → V ′(a) such
that for all s ∈ X we have s ≤s g(s).
Lemma 8. ≤ev is a partial order.
Proof. Omitted. uunionsq
The next lemma formalizes the intuition that epistemic information grows along a
call sequence.
Lemma 9. For all two call sequences such that c  d we have EV (c) ≤ev EV (d).
Proof. Let d = c.c′. Take a ∈ A. Note that by a repeated application of Lemma 5 we can
show that EV (c.c′)(a) = {c′(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and ∀c′′c′ c′′(s)a = c′′(c(root))a}.
It suffices then to pick X = {s ∈ EV (c)(a) | ∀c′′c′ c′′(s)a = c′′(c(root))a}, and set
g(s) = c′(s) for all s ∈ X . It is easy to check that such g : X → EV (d) is surjective,
so EV (c) ≤ev EV (d). uunionsq
We can now draw the following useful conclusion.
Lemma 10. Suppose that c is epistemically redundant. Then a prefix c1.c of it exists
such that c1 is epistemically non-redundant and EV (c1.c) = EV (c1).
Proof. Let c1.c2 be the shortest prefix of c such that EV (c1) = EV (c1.c2). Then c1
is epistemically non-redundant. Let c2 = c1. . . . .cl. By Lemma 9 we have EV (c1) ≤s
EV (c1.c1) ≤s EV (c1.c1.c2) ≤s . . . ≤s EV (c1.c1.c2. . . . .cl) = EV (c1.c2) = EV (c1).
Since ≤s is a partial order, EV (c1.c1) = EV (c1) holds. uunionsq
Finally we can establish the desired result.
Theorem 7 (Decidability of Termination). Given a gossip protocol it is decidable to
determine whether it always terminates.
Proof. We first prove that a gossip protocol may fail to terminate iff it can generate a
call sequence c.c such that c is epistemically non-redundant and EV (c.c) = EV (c).
(⇒ ) Let c be an infinite sequence of calls generated by the protocol. There are only
finitely many epistemic views, so some prefix c of c is epistemically redundant. The
claim now follows by Lemma 10.
(⇐ ) Suppose that the protocol generates a sequence of calls c.c such that c is epistem-
ically non-redundant and EV (c.c) = EV (c).
Let φ be the guard associated with the call c. By assumption (M, c) |= φ. By the
assumption about the gossip protocols the formula φ is without nested modalities, so
by Lemma 4 (M, c.c) |= φ. Hence by the repeated use of the Stuttering Theorem 3, for
all i ≥ 1, (M, c.ci) |= φ. Consequently, c.cω is an infinite sequence of calls that can
be generated by the protocol.
The above equivalence shows that determining whether the protocol always termi-
nates is equivalent to checking that it cannot generate a call sequence c.c such that c is
epistemically non-redundant and EV (c.c) = EV (c).
But given a call sequence, by the Decidability of Semantics Theorem 5, it is de-
cidable to determine whether it can be generated by the protocol and by Lemma 3 it is
decidable to determine whether a call sequence is epistemically non-redundant. Further,
by Lemma 7 there are only finitely many epistemically non-redundant call sequences,
so the claim follows. uunionsq
8 Conclusions
In this paper we studied decidability questions concerning a natural epistemic logic ap-
propriate for expressing gossip protocols. One of our aims was to show that the gossip
protocols considered in [1] are executable. A self-contained summary is that the seman-
tics of the introduced epistemic language L is decidable for formulas with no nested
modalities. Another aim was to prove that partial correctness of the gossip protocols
studied in [1] is decidable. To this end we showed that truth of formulas of L with no
nested modalities is decidable. This implies the former since partial correctness of such
a gossip protocol means that a specific epistemic formula, namely the conjunction of the
negation of all guards implies that each agent is an expert, is true and such a formula has
no nested modalities. Finally, we showed the problem of determining termination of a
gossip protocol is decidable. An interesting open question is whether all of these results
can be extended to arbitrary formulas of the language L. The main stumbling block in
generalizing our proofs is that, as Example 5 shows, the crucial Semantic Stuttering
Lemma 1 cannot be extended to arbitrary formulas of L.
These considerations lead to another interesting open problem. Gossip protocols
studied in [1] are parametric in the sense that they are formulated in such a way that
they do not depend on the underlying graph (for instance a ring). The results we proved
allow us only to consider each specific gossip protocol (for example for a ring formed
by 5 agents) separately. What is needed is a decision procedure that would allow us
to consider all instances of a protocol (for example for all rings) simultaneously. We
conjecture that this decision problem is undecidable both for partial correctness and for
termination.
The semantics we introduced in Section 3 stipulates through the definition of c(s)
that a call ab is not noted by any agent c 6= a, b. In [3] different type of calls were
studied, namely
– ab−, which stipulates that every agent c 6= a, b noted that a called b,
– ab0, which stipulates that every agent c 6= a, b noted that some call took place,
though not between whom,
– ab+ which stipulates that every agent c 6= a, b noted that possibly some call took
place, though not between whom.
It would be interesting to check whether our results hold for these types of calls, as well.
Another issue interesting to study is the synthesis of a distributed epistemic gossip
protocol from epistemic specifications. For a related work on a synthesis of a knowledge-
based programs see, e.g. [12]. Finally, it would be interesting to study the decidability
of the problems considered here for a variant of our logic in which the only modal op-
erator is the common knowledge operator CGφ. This operator states that the formula
φ is commonly known among the group of agents G. The standard semantics of this
operator is given in [5].
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